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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the trade-diversion effects of regional trade agreements (RTAs), so-
called “Spaghetti bowl” Phenomenon (SBP), in multilateral trade. The SBP is due to the 
proliferation of RTAs. Thus, I investigate the relationship between the number of RTAs 
concluded by a country and the additional trade value attributed to an RTA. Using bilateral trade 
data in a sample of 119 countries, from 1995 to 2012, my main finding reveals a negative trade-
effect between them, confirming the existence of SBP multilateral trade. However, results could 
not conclude evidence of a negative effect of overlapping RTAs, involving the existence of SBP, 
within North-North, North-South or South-South trade. But, the additional trade value 
attributed to an RTA concluded with EU countries or US seems to confirm significantly a trade-
diversion effect because of the number of RTAs signed by these countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)
1
 are sweeping the multilateral trade system 
like wildfire while WTO talks advance at a glacial rate (Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012). 
There has been renewed interest in RTAs in the two decades especially after the Doha 
round talks stalled. As Bhagwati (2008) noted, the regionalism is a threat to the 
multilatelalism. A “...major drawback of this free trade regime has been identified, which 
tends to proliferation of regionalism at the cost of dilution of multilateralism” (Pandey, 
2006: 1)
2
. The most common theoretical explanation is that negotiators are frustrated 
attempting to achieve multilateral free trade. Thus, Nations are increasingly eager to 
negotiate bilaterally removing barriers because multilateralism talks are progressing so 
slowly (e.g. Krugman, 1993; Bhagwati, 2008).
3
 Also, the multiple memberships of RTAs 
may generate duty-free market access and zero-tariffs on imports with many trading 
partners and can hence be an appealing alternative to national policy makers as a 
substitute to free trade (Schiff and Winters 2003: 75). Therefore, RTAs have become a 
ubiquitous feature of global trade. 
Since 2001, the international trade is a drastic increase in RTAs across the world 
(see Fig. 1a). In general, the formation of RTAs between countries has evolved. For a 
long time, most RTAs were regional in focus with members being geographically close to 
                                                          
1
 In what follow, I take Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to mean any preferential access for members 
of such an agreement. Thus RTAs are used to encompass set of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), Customs 
Unions (CUs), and Common Markets (CMs). In practice, there are some differences between these 
categories of RTAs. In a FTA group, countries enforce their own external trade restrictions. In a CU group, 
members adopt a common set of external trade restrictions (Grant ant Lambert, 2008). In a CM area, the 
movement of factors must be unrestricted and fiscal, monetary, and other economic policies must be 
harmonized between members (DeRosa, 1998). 
Note that RTAs were conceived as an exception to Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause to cater to the 
specific needs of developing as well as developed countries (see Art. XXIV of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade – GATT). According provisions on RTAs in GATT, the formation of a RTA commits 
members to eliminate restrictions on “subtantially” all trade.   
2
 Pandey, Sanjay, Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon and Crucification of Multilateralism: Task Ahead for WTO 
(December 10, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=951392 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.951392 (accessed on 8 august 2014).       
3
 According to Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), the Bilateralism/Regionalism phenomenon may also 
explained by idiosyncratic events (such as the US’s opening of the US-Canada FTA talks in 1996, the 
breakup of the USSR in 1991, and the Asian Crisis of 1997) and by some institutional needs (such as 
democracy, transparency, and geopolitical stability). 
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each other (e.g. EU, NAFTA, ECOWAS, ASEAN, etc.). Nowadays, countries or regional 
blocs have signed or negociate RTAs with diverse and geographically distant partners 
(e.g. EPAs, CETA, TPP, TTIP).
4
 The number of the second RTA-type is increasingly 
important. The number of RTAs (in force) notified to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) increased from 40 in 1993 to 258 in 2013.
5
 Nowadays, “the world faces the 
prospect of over 400 RTAs” (Grant and Lambert, 2008: 765). Baldwin and Jaimovich 
(2012) explain the multiplication of RTAs by contagion effet testing the hypothesis that 
the domino-like spread of regionalism is partly driven by ‘defensive’ RTAs.  
[Figure 1 (here)] 
Theorically the nature of an RTA is to promote trade and investment between members 
(see Fig. 1b). But, the formation of a RTA has different impact on partner states and third 
countries (trade creation and diversion effects). “On one hand, liberalization with certain 
trade partners generates positive effects as high-cost products in the home country can be 
substituted to low-cost products from the partner countries [trade creation effect]. One the 
other hand, as preferential integration is discriminatory, countries outside the agreement 
face higher tariffs than the member [trade diversion effect]” (Fergin, 2011: 6). The 
products from a non-member country will instead be imported from member countries 
that do not face tariffs, even though they are not the most efficient producers. According 
to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009: 171), RTAs has generated a new inefficiency and this is 
                                                          
4
 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between European Union (EU) and Africa-Caribbean-Pacific 
(ACP) group; the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between EU and Canada; the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is being negotiated between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, 
United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan (Taiwan, South Korea 
announced their interest in November 2013); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) is 
being negotiated between EU and United States. 
5
 My data on RTAs comes from than the WTO database which lists only agreements (in force) that have 
been officially notified to the WTO: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (accessed on 07 July 
2014). This WTO database does not include data regarding preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) notified. 
For last ones, see http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx (accessed on 07 July 2014). 
It exist another Trade Agreements Database developed by Hufbauer and Schott (2009) which lists 
agreements (notified or not to the WTO) from 1948 to 2007. Hufbauer-Schott database was updated by 
Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012): only 329 agreements of 570 agreements recorded in Hufbauer-Schott 
database were still force in 2007.  
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the trade diverting part. The main critic of preferential integration is that regional trading 
blocs limit global trade liberalization due to high external trade barriers (Fergin, 2011). 
However, the proliferation of RTAs would create a so-called “Spaghetti bowl” 
phenomenon (SBP) in global trade (Bhagwati, 1995). The “Spagetti bowl” is  a metaphor 
to illustrate the numerous and crisscrossing RTAs, where innumerable applicable tariff 
rates and a multiplicity of rules of origin (RoOs) must coexist. According to Bhagwati et 
al. (1998), this situation impose higher transaction to firms and distort trade and 
investment flows. That is the “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP) which negatively 
impacts trade. In academic litterature, except Kimura et al. (2006) and Fergin (2011), the 
trade effect of “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP) has no been  seriously quantify. As 
pointed out Dai, Yotov and Zylkin (2014), trade-diversion effects of RTAs have not been 
throughly examined empirically. These autors found that RTAs divert trade away from 
non-member countries and even more so from internal trade in member countries. 
Kimura et al. (2006) quatifyed the trade impact of “proliferation” of RTAs using 
cross-section data (for 2002/2003). Their findings determine significatively a trade 
creation effect for RTAs about 1.76 and 3.80 and a trade-diversion of RTAs like 
“Spagetti bowl” phenomenon estimated -0.76 to -1.39,  depending to model specification. 
These results are likely overestimated. Their estimating model does not control for the 
‘gravitational un-constat’6 and for self-selection into RTAs. Moreover, “the discussion 
about proper econometric specification of gravity model has shown that the conventional 
cross-section formulation without the inclusion of country-specific effects is misspecified 
and so introduces a bias in the assessment of the effects of RTAs” (Carrère, 2006: 224). 
For these reasons the findings of RTAs effect in Kimura et al. (2006) are likely to be 
unreliable because of estimation bias.  
Fergin (2011) discusses the spaghetti bowl effect, which can be regarded as a 
potential negative transaction cost effect of RTA proliferation. Using also cross sectional 
                                                          
6
 That is what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) refer to as the ‘multilateral resistance’, or Frankel and 
Wei (2008) qualify as ‘remoteness’. 
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data covering intra-Africa bilateral trade flows for Africa’s 53 countries, she conclude 
“any robust evidence for the hypothesis of a negative trade effect caused by the spaghetti 
bowl phenomenon on the RTA effect” Fergin (2011: 32). 
In contrast to the cross-section gravity model used by these authors, I apply in this 
paper a panel gravity specification (modeling as ramdom effects) which includes country-
time fixed effects. This panel specification controls for unobservable characteristics of 
each country-dyad. In sum, I investigate the trade-diversion effects of RTAs like a 
“Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP) with proper econometric specification of the 
gravity model following recent empirical discussions. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follow. Section 2 develops my estimating 
equation taking into account relevant empirical methods on RTA’s trade effects. Section 
3 discusses data used for estimations. My empirical results are reported in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents the concluding remarks. 
2. Empirical modelling 
To examine the relationship between proliferation of RTAs (so-called “Spaghetti 
Bowl” Phenomenon) and trade promotion, I adopt a typical gravity-type regression of the 
log-linearized form: 
 
1 2
1
log( ) log( ) log( )
n
t t t t t
ij i j ij h ijh ij
h
T GDP GDP Dist X     

        (1)   
t
ijT  represents export values of country i to country j at time t. 
t
iGDP  and 
t
jGDP  denote 
respectively the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in country i and j at time t. 
1
n
t
ijh
h
X

  is a 
set of other country-pair characteristics (e.g. contiguity, common language, GATT/WTO 
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membership, legal system, etc.) at time t. 
ijDist  is geographical distance between 
countries i and  j. ij  is a disturbance term.  
To measure the trade-effect attributed of RTAs, I intrduce in equation (1) a 
“RTA” dummy ( tijRTA ) which is a binary variable taking unity if trading partners 
conclude, at time t, an RTA and zero otherwise. That is, the typical gravity equation is 
augmented by including interaction terms between the dummy for RTA membership as 
the following: 
1 2
1
log( ) log( ) log( )
n
t t t t t t
ij i j ij ij h ijh ij
h
T GDP GDP Dist RTA X      

         (2)  
The trade-effect of RTA is examined on the coefficient   for “RTA” dummy. 
The estimates of this coefficient of interest, from equation (2), are potentially 
contaminated by an endogeneity bias due to self-selection of countries. Countries choose 
their trading partners into RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) as well as the form of the 
RTA (Vicard, 2009) according to economic and political factors. This causes a downward 
bias on estimates of effect of RTAs on trade, “...because a country pair that has more to 
gain from regional integration is more likely to create an RTA and to choose the 
appropriate nature of regional integration” (Shahid, 2011: 16). To deal for this 
endogeneity bias, literature suggests to use a panel data with county pair and country-
and-time fixed effects (Heckman 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). But, this method does not 
allow investigating which kinds of country pairs gain more from RTA even if it yields 
consistent estimates (Vicard, 2011: 189). All country specific variables and time-
invariant country-pair specific variables are dropped due to the inclusion of the latter 
fixed effects. For this reason Vicard (2011) suggests to introduce interaction variables 
between country-pair characteristics and the RTA membership dummy. The consistent 
gravity equation suggested by Vicard (2011) is 
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1
m
t t t t t t t
ij ij k ij ijk i j ij ij
k
T RTA RTA DV FE FE FE   

          (3) 
t
iFE  and 
t
jFE  are country-and-year fixed effects, and ijFE  is bilateral-pair fixed effects. 
t t
ij ijRTA DV  is a set of country-pair characteristics (
t
ijDV ) interacted with RTA dummy. 
Estimating equations 
I define my gravity equation using country-and-year fixed effects, but not adding 
bilateral-pair fixed effects. This is unnecessary since the country-pair variables (distance, 
contiguity, common language, legal system, etc.) control for the idiosyncratic bilateral 
trade factors.
7
 Thus, the equation (2) is rewritten adding country-and-year fixed effects (
t
iFE  and 
t
jFE ). As pointed out by Baldwin (2006), the increase in the number of RTAs 
can be described as a spaghetti bowl of trade agreements. I introduce an interaction 
variable between the number of RTA concluded by each country and the RTA 
membership dummy to measure “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP) effect on trade:  
1 2
1
log( ) log( )t t RTAij ij ij ijt
t
n
ij t t t t
h ijh i j ij
h
Dist RTA RTA NUM
T
X FE FE
   
 

    
 
  
    
 

  (4) 
The variables 
t
iGDP  and 
t
jGDP  are dropped by introducing country-and-year fixed 
effects. The variable
RTA
ijtNUM , defined by 
RTA RTA
it jtNUM NUM , denotes the product of 
number of RTA in force concluded by each trading country (exporter and importer) in 
dyad, at time t. The multiplicative-variable specified by log( )t RTAij ijtRTA NUM  is defined 
as a proxy of the “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP).8 All other variables were 
                                                          
7
 Also, introducing bilateral-pair effects would entail additional regressors which due to the large dataset 
was not possible to compute. 
8
 As suggested by one reviewer, in principle variable 
RTA
ijtNUM can be also included linearly in the model 
because it is not controlled for by country fixed effects. I ran equation (4) including this variable but it did 
not produce robust results. I thank the reviewer for this point.     
 9 
 
previously defined above. Regardless of the existence of the SBP, coefficient 1  of RTA 
should be positively estimated. And if a trade-effect of SBP exists, coefficient 2  is 
expected to be negative. Data and source for each variables used in my estimating 
equation (4) are described below in Table 1 at section 3. Using the variable
RTA
ijtNUM , 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the negative effect of RTAs’ proliferation, so-called 
“Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP). 
[Figure 2 (here)] 
Literature suggests that in absence of correlation between explanatory variables 
and the bilateral trade, coefficients estimated by the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
estimator are consistent.
9
 But, according to Baier and Bergstrand (2002: 5), “...the [RTA] 
dummy variables may be correlated with unobservable (omitted) variables that are 
correlated also with the decision to trade”.  In gravity equation, one of the source of 
endogeneity bias is potentially unobserved heterogeneity. The unobservable bilateral 
variables – included in the error term – influence simultaneously of variable of interest 
(RTA) and volume of trade. The best way to account for endogeneity due to omitted 
variable bias is to use fixed effects modeling (see Raimondi et al. 2012; De Benedictis 
and Taglioni, 2011; Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2009; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
10
 My 
estimating equation (4) includes the time varying multilateral resistance terms (country-
and-time fixed effects – t
iFE  and 
t
jFE ).  
Traditionally, the log-linearized form of gravity-type equation is estimated by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS). However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that this 
method suffers two source of bias. It does not address problem of the multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity from the original non-linear model, and the logarithm-form excludes 
observations with zero trade. To deal with both problems, Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
                                                          
9
 However, variables as GDP or infrastructures may be correlated with bilateral specific effects (Carrère, 
2006). 
10
 Egger (2000) rejects the random effect gravity modeling, using either bilateral-pair or country-specific 
fixed effects. 
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(2006) suggest Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. They show that 
the PPML procedure yields consistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
accounts the problem of zero in bilateral trade.
11
 Thus, I just comment PPML results as 
benchmark estimation. And, as proposed by Cameron et al. (2011), my all empirical 
estimations use a two-way clustering of errors at the country level to control for this issue 
(Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012; Cameron et al., 2011).
12
 Computing cluster-robust 
standard errors in estimations allowed accounting for correlation in the residuals over 
years within trade pairs. 
In my case, I use the aggregated bilateral trade flows for all products. Thus, a 
first-stage selection correction is not needed. Therefore, the coefficients of the equation 
(4), transforming dependant variable in log( )
t
ijT , are typically estimated with Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). I report OLS results as a robustness check. Also, for robustness 
check, I present an alternative methodology that deals with the unobserved heterogeneity 
issue. I re-estimate equation (4) using first-differencing specification with country-year 
fixed effects to account for the time varying multilateral resistance terms. According 
literature, in panel data “...with two time periods, and when the error terms are equivalent 
to differencing the data around the mean” (Grant and Lambert, 2008: 770). Panel data 
modelling with fixed effects and first-differencing are not equivalent, when the number 
of time periods is more than two. The first case is source of potential presence of serially 
correlated error terms (Egger, 2002). Thus, Wooldridge (2002) notes that first-
differencing should increase estimation efficiency. However, the first-differenced 
estimation drops the time-invariable variables (common border, common language, 
common legal, and common colonizer). 
                                                          
11
 An alternative method is the Heckman sample selection model (see Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 
2008). This method yields to include zero-trade observations in the estimation samples by assuming that 
positive and zero trade observations are drawn from different but related models. But “the main 
disadvantage of this approach is that it requires strong distributional assumptions in order to be consistent, 
whereas Poison is consistent under much weaker assumption” (Lejárraga et al., 2013: 119). Furthermore, 
the literature establishes that PPML estimator is equivalent to (weighted) non-linear least squares (see 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; and Winkelmann, 2003 for more details). 
12
 The inference in dyadic regressions is problematic because observations in trade data are not independent 
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). 
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3. Data analysis 
My working data (balanced panel data) covers bilateral trade during the period 
1995-2012 for a total of 119 trading partners (see Appendix for the countries list). Thus, I 
have potentially a total of 252’756 (119x118x18) observations representing 14’042 
country-pair. The variable of trade (
t
ijT ) represents exports from country i to partner j at 
time t. Data on bilateral trade (imports and exports in U.S dollars) comes from the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). Distance measures 
(between countries) were from Centre d’Étude Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII). Bilateral distances were calculated referencing by latitudes and 
longitudes of the largest urban agglomerations in terms of populations:  
 ij h gh g
g i h j
Dist d 
 
 
  
 
  , where ghd  is the distance between the two sub-regions 
g i  and h j  and g  and h represent the economic activity share of the 
corresponding sub-region. 
The dummy variables “common border”, “common legal”, “common colonizer” 
and “common language” were from CEPII. To account a potential impact of the 
economic crisis (in 2008/2009) on international trade flow, I introduce a dummy variable 
“crisis” in order to control for that in estimations. Also, I introduce another dummy 
variable “GATT/WTO” to control for trade-effect of WTO membership accession. Table 1 
gives the details about sources and data construction of variables, and description 
statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2.  
[Table 1 (here)] 
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My data on RTAs comes from WTO which lists only trade agreements that have 
been offically notified by Members.
13
 Among these agreements, there are Free Trade 
agreements, Preferential Agreements (i.e. Trade Agreement among developing nations 
which allows tariffs to be preferential without going to zero), Costum Unions, and 
bilateral or multilateral consultative frameworks. To avoid linguistic infelicities, I refers 
to all of them as RTAs. The variable “RTA” is dummy variable refering to existence of a 
trade agreement between trading partners in dyad. My data accounts only RTAs in force. 
This gives a cumulative total of 247 RTAs notified and still in force over the period 
1995-2012. According to my working sample, more than 32% of the considered RTAs 
involve European Union (EU) countries or United States (US), about 45% of RTAs were 
signed by trading countries in OECD group, and more than 40% involve a country of 
BRICS group. 
[Table 2 (here)] 
4. Resultats and Discussion 
Table 3 provides results from the PPML and OLS estimations. The columns (1) et 
(2) of present the log-level panel results using equation (4), and the results from the two 
last columns (3 & 4) are robustness check. In all these results (columns 1 to 4), the 
coefficients for standard gravity variables are highly significant (at the 95% confidence 
level) and have the expected negative sign. International trade is negatively correlated 
with geographic distances between trading countries. Results also confirm that the 
economic crisis (2008/2009) had a negative impact on international trade. The 
coefficients for gravity dummy variables (GATT/WTO, common border, common 
language, common legal, and common colonizer) are positively estimated as expected.  
[Table 3 (here)] 
                                                          
13
 See Database on  http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (accessed on 07 July 2014). 
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As expected, the coefficients estimated for RTA dummy are positively significant 
(columns 1 & 2 in Table 3). Comparing the results in the two first columns show that the SBP 
variable is relevant for my regression model. The specification without the SBP variable 
seems cause an exaggeration of the coefficients of other explanatory variables, considering the 
specification with SBP. However, these results confirm that RTA formation increases trade 
values in general between Members. Even so, my regression result (in column 2) reveals 
significantly a negative coefficient on the multiplicative-variable [RTAij*log(NUMij
RTA
)] 
defined as a proxy for measuring the “Spaghetti bowl” phenomenon (SBP).  
Furthermore, the coefficients estimated in column (2) appear empirically to be 
robust and are consistent with the results of robustness check (columns 3 & 4).
14
 This 
main finding confirms, as expected, the existence of a trade-diversion in international 
trade so-called SBP caused by the multiplication of RTAs around the world. Thus, 
signing other agreements with third countries by at least one of the members of trading-
dyad having a RTA can on average to decrease trade in dyad. By referring to PPML-
results in columns (1 & 2), the proliferation of RTAs across the world led to an average 
decrease of trade by 13%, all else constant. This negative effect of multiplication of 
RTAs reduces the magnitude of direct trade-creation effect of RTA. For my sample, the 
final impact of RTAs was, on average, a net trade-creation by 23% considering the direct 
effect of RTA formation (a trade-increase by 35.8%). 
Otherwise, in models with log-transformed dependent variables, dummy variables 
can be interpreted as elasticity (Sorgho and Bruno, 2014; Giles, 1982).
15
 For this 
interpretation, I considered estimates from log-transformed regression (column 3). 
Therefore, the coefficient for the variable SBP can be discussed as the effect of third 
RTAs signed by at least one of the parties on trade in a dyad having a RTA. Also, the 
                                                          
14
 The result of RTA trade-effect in column (2) is also significantly close to that found in the recent 
literature about RTAs’ trade-creation (e.g. Magee, 2008; Baier and Berstrand, 2009; Vicard, 2011; Foster, 
Poeschl and Stehrer, 2011; Dai, Yotov and Zylkin, 2014 ). 
15
 ˆ  is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable of interest, then the estimated elasticity is 
  ˆ ˆ100 exp 0.5var 1      , where  
ˆvar   is the variance of the estimated coefficient . 
 14 
 
coefficient for RTA dummy-variable can be interpreted as the gain of trade in a dyad 
having a RTA by comparing to a similar dyad without RTA, all else constant. 
Therefore, according to the column (2) for specification including SBP variable, 
two RTA members on average traded 51.89% [=(exp(0.418)-1)*100] more than two 
otherwise similar non-RTA members, all else constant. My estimates suggest that the 
trade-effect of SBP was -0.166 from 1995 to 2012 (column 2). By a similar interpretation 
as before, when two trading countries have a RTA, third RTAs concluded by one of both 
countries decreased on average their trade by 18.06%, all else being equal. In doing so, 
the net effect of RTAs was an average increase of international trade by 33.83% 
considering that the negative trade-effect of the RTAs’ proliferation around the world. 
[Table 4 (here)] 
Now I would like to know in which trading dyad the spaghetti bowl effect (SBP) 
is the most stringent. Table 4 reports the PPML-estimates from the equation (4) for 
different subsamples. First, I investigated SBP on trade within North countries (column 
1), within South countries including BRICS countries (column 2), and between 
developed and developing countries (column 3). Secondly, I re-estimated the equation (4) 
considering the internal trade between developing countries and Rest of the World 
(column 4), between developed countries and Rest of the World (column 5), between 
BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa) and Rest of the World (column 
6), between OECD countries and Rest of the World (column 7), and the internal trade 
involving European Union countries or United States (US/EU) and Rest of the World 
(column 8). Finally, the last two columns report respectively results for estimations on 
internal trade between US/EU and developed countries (column 9), and internal trade 
between US/EU and OECD countries (column 10). 
For the ten subsamples considered, I remark that estimates for the North-North 
trade (column 1), or for the trading-samples involving BRICS countries (column 6), 
OECD countries (column 7), and US/EU (columns 8 to 10), the coefficient on SBP trade-
 15 
 
effect is significantly negative. For example, the negative trade-effect of RTAs’ 
multiplication, so-called SBP, has respectively represented an average reduction of trade 
by 9%, 7% and 4% for dyads US/EU and Rest of the World (RoW), US/EU and North 
countries, and US/EU and OECD. It has represented an average reduction by 8.5% for 
North-North countries. Contrariwise, the estimates of columns (2) and (4) suggest in 
particular that the multiplication of RTAs has respectively a positive effect on trade 
between developing countries and RoW, and on South-South trade. In short, the increase 
of the number of RTAs appears to be a trade-positive factor in South-South trade, while it 
involves a negative effect on North-North trade. I also note that the trade with developed 
countries (and RoW), and South (and North) reveals respectively a negative and positive 
sign of the coefficient of the interacted-variable (“SBP” trade-effect). But the coefficients 
are not statistically significant. It is possible that some countries possess a larger 
administrative capacity and institutional capital than others to minimize transaction costs 
due to multiple agreement membership. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates empirical analysis on the spaghetti bowl phenomenon 
related to overlapping RTAs as pointed out by Bhagwati (1995). My empirical findings 
suggest a significantly negative relationship between the number of RTAs concluded by a 
country and the additional trade value attributed to a RTA conclusion. Trade with the EU 
or US seems to be particularly the most affected by this effect of spaghetti bowl. In sum, instead 
of promoting trade, the multiplication of RTAs might instead result trade diversion 
effects because of higher transaction costs due to a mass of overlapping rules. 
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Figure 1. RTA formation and International Trade – from 1995 to 2012. 
 
Fig. 1a. 
Trade flows and Number of RTAs 
 
Fig. 1b. 
Trade flows with and without a RTA 
 
  
Figure 2. Overview of “Spaghetti bowl” Phenomenon (SBP) in multilateral trade. 
 
Fig. 2a. 
 
 
Fig. 2a. 
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Table 1. Variables descriptions and data sources. 
Variable Description Source 
t
ijT  Value of exports from country i to partner j at year t. WITS-COMTRADE 
ijDist  
Great circle distance between the main cities of country i 
and its partner  j. 
CEPII 
Common border 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for countries that share a 
common land border, and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
Common language 
Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j 
share the same official language, and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
GATT/WTO 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if both trading countries i 
and j are  GATT/WTO’ Members at year t. 
WTO 
RTA 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if both trading countries i 
and j share a same RTA membership at year t. 
WTO 
RTA
ijtNUM  
The product of number of RTA concluded by each 
trading country (exporter and importer) in dyad, at year t. 
- 
Crisis 2008/09 
Dummy variable that values 1 for the years 2008 or 
2009, and 0 otherwise. 
- 
Common legal 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for countries sharing a 
common legal origin (namely UK, French, German, or 
Socialist), and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
Common colonizer 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for countries that were 
colonized by the same Power and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
 
 
    Table 2. Description statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
t
ijT  252756 5.35e
+08
 4.91e
+09 
0 3.52e
+11 
ijDist  252756 7182.056 4280.143 114.637 19648.45 
Common border 252756 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Common language 252756 0.112 0.315 0 1 
GATT/WTO 252756 0.706 0.456 0 1 
RTA 252756 0.198 0.399 0 1 
RTA number per country 252756 7.342 9.395 0 39 
Crisis 2008/09 252756 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Common legal 252756 0.314 0.464 0 1 
Common colonizer 252756 0.072 0.259 0 1 
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Table 3.  Estimation Results and Evidence of “Spaghetti bowl” Phenomenon  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PPML PPML OLS First-difference 
Log distance -1.179*** 
(0.034) 
-1.078*** 
(0.033) 
-1.437*** 
(0.031) 
– 
Common border 0.756*** 
(0.123) 
0.875*** 
(0.108) 
0.681*** 
(0.125) 
– 
Common language 0.701*** 
(0.047) 
0.699*** 
(0.046) 
0.625*** 
(0.063) 
– 
GATT/WTO 0.052 
(0.067) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.061 
(0.153) 
– 
Δ GATT/WTO – – –    0.114* 
(0.082) 
RTA 0.382*** 
(0.029) 
0.358*** 
(0.036) 
0.418*** 
(0.091) 
– 
Δ RTA – – –    0.531*** 
(0.166) 
SBP  –   -0.128*** 
(0.018) 
-0.166*** 
(0.019) 
– 
Δ SBP – – –  -0.191* 
(0.166) 
Crisis 08/09 -0.453** 
(0.147) 
-0.422** 
(0.116) 
-0.505** 
(0.223) 
– 
Δ Crisis 08/09 – – –   -0.496* 
(0.282) 
Common legal 0.388*** 
(0.031) 
0.319*** 
(0.029) 
0.390*** 
(0.040) 
– 
Common colonizer 0.683*** 
(0.082) 
0.635*** 
(0.062) 
0.704*** 
(0.084) 
– 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2 
0.830 0.841 0.832 0.524 
Observations 252’756 252’756 176’399 176’399 
Clusters 14’042 14’042 12’784 12’784 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses, pooled data by country-pair (importer-
exporter). Coefficients with * indicate significance at the 10% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% 
level, and *** indicate significance at the 1% level. The variables with Δ are reported for first-differenced 
estimation.  
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Table 4.  Log-Level Gravity Equation – PPML Results for Various Samples with Panel Data, 1995-2012. 
 
(1) 
(N↔N) 
(2) 
(S↔S) 
(3) 
(S↔N) 
(4) 
(S↔RoW) 
(5) 
(N↔RoW) 
(6) 
(BRICS↔RoW) 
(7) 
(OECD↔RoW) 
(8) 
(US/EU↔RoW) 
(9) 
(US/EU↔N) 
(10) 
(US/EU↔OECD) 
Log distance -0.975
***
 
(0.076) 
-1.328
***
 
(0.046) 
-1.093
***
 
(0.052) 
-0.832
***
 
(0.028) 
-1.082
***
 
(0.036) 
-1.004
***
 
(0.079) 
-1.187
***
 
(0.062) 
-1.241
***
 
(0.061) 
-1.022
***
 
(0.067) 
-1.143
***
 
(0.082) 
Common border 0.161
** 
(0.074) 
0.890
***
 
(0.138) 
0.688
***
 
(0.184) 
0.974
***
 
(0.083) 
0.143
* 
(0.101) 
1.082
***
 
(0.194) 
0.242
* 
(0.181) 
0.157
** 
(0.061) 
0.186 
(0.189) 
0.119 
(0.165) 
Common language 0.085
***
 
(0.017) 
0.432
***
 
(0.088) 
0.369
***
 
(0.094) 
0.394
***
 
(0.065) 
0.229
***
 
(0.080) 
0.562
***
 
(0.129) 
0.328
***
 
(0.082) 
0.331
***
 
(0.093) 
0.255
***
 
(0.084) 
0.289
***
 
(0.087) 
GATT/WTO 0.046 
(0.094) 
0.193
**
 
(0.079) 
1.086
***
 
(0.269) 
0.142
** 
(0.063) 
0.813
***
 
(0.121) 
0.748
*** 
(0.083) 
0.074
** 
(0.032) 
0.631
***
 
(0.126) 
0.089 
(0.246) 
0.038 
(0.805) 
“RTA” trade-effect 0.330*** 
(0.081) 
0.463
***
 
(0.072) 
0.139
* 
(0.119) 
0.158
* 
(0.143) 
0.029 
(0.072) 
0.146
* 
(0.119) 
0.118
* 
(0.074) 
0.259
*** 
(0.072) 
0.156
** 
(0.062) 
0.279
*** 
(0.089) 
“SBP” trade-effect -0.085*** 
(0.019) 
0.069
* 
(0.049) 
0.113 
(0.223) 
0.096
* 
(0.062) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.064
** 
(0.031) 
-0.075
* 
(0.045) 
-0.093
***
 
(0.015) 
-0.071
* 
(0.022) 
-0.039
** 
(0.016) 
Crisis 2008/09 -1.032
*** 
(0.316) 
-0.468
 
(0.766) 
-0.692
* 
(0.496) 
 -0.893
* 
(0.805) 
-0.939
*** 
(0.203) 
-0.787
 
(1.168) 
-0.862
 
(1.047) 
-1.113
** 
(0.561) 
-1.612
** 
(0.675) 
-0.699
*** 
(0.086) 
Common legal 0.416
***
 
(0.054) 
0.201
***
 
(0.050) 
0.560
*** 
(0.049) 
0.230
*** 
(0.034) 
0.600
*** 
(0.051) 
0.381
*** 
(0.086) 
0.643
*** 
(0.048) 
0.651
*** 
(0.048) 
0.572
*** 
(0.050) 
0.642
*** 
(0.055) 
Common colonizer 0.587 
(0.470) 
0.894
***
 
(0.083) 
-0.131 
(0.178) 
0.258
*** 
(0.049) 
0.111 
(0.167) 
0.141 
(0.166) 
0.446 
(0.310) 
0.805
*** 
(0.153) 
0.363
** 
(0.180) 
1.106
*** 
(0.275) 
R
2 
0.821 0.693 0.804 0.621 0.829 0.842 0.835 0.806 0.857 0.831 
Observations 16’740 77’984 81’975 10’891 98’415 15’342 89’903 86’590 75’167 68’579 
Clusters 930 6’624 5’230 810 6’160 1’120 5’956 5’462 4’662 4’470 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses, pooled data by country pair (importer-exporter). Coefficients with * indicate significance at the 
10% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level, and *** indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Appendix. Countries in the sample, number of RTAs in 2012. 
ISO Countries RTAs  ISO Countries RTAs 
ALB Albania 4  FRA France 39 
ARE United Arab Emirates 2  GAB Gabon 0 
ARG Argentina 4  GBR Great Britain & N. Ireland  38 
ARM Armenia 9  GEO Georgia 8 
AUS Australia 8  GHA Ghana 2 
AUT Austria 36  GIN Guinea  2 
AZE Azerbaijan 5  GNB Guinea-Bissau  1 
BDI Burundi 3  GRC Greece 37 
BEL Belgium 39  GTM Guatemala 7 
BEN Benin  3  HND Honduras 7 
BFA Burkina Faso 2  HRV Croatia 2 
BGD Bangladesh 5  HTI Haiti 1 
BGR Bulgaria 34  HUN Hungary 34 
BHR Bahrain 3  IDN Indonesia 7 
BLR Belarus 7  IND India 14 
BLZ Belize 2  IRL Ireland 38 
BOL Bolivia 3  IRN Iran 2 
BRA Brazil 5  ISL Iceland 25 
CAF Central African Republic 1  ISR Israel 7 
CAN Canada 8  ITA Italy 39 
CHE Switzerland 28  JAM Jamaica 2 
CHL Chile 24  JOR Jordan 7 
CHN China 10  JPN Japan 13 
CIV Ivory Coast 3  KAZ Kazakhstan 11 
COL Colombia 11  KEN Kenya 3 
CRI Costa Rica 7  KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 10 
CYP Cyprus 34  KHM Cambodia  6 
CZE Czech Republic 34  KWT Kuwait 2 
DEU Germany 39  LBR Liberia 1 
DNK Denmark 39  LKA Sri Lanka  6 
DOM Dominican Republic 3  LTU Lithuania 34 
DZA Algeria  2  LUX Luxembourg 39 
EGY Egypt 7  LVA Latvia 34 
ESP Spain 36  MAR Morocco 6 
EST Estonia 34  MDG Madagascar 2 
ETH Ethiopia 1  MEX Mexico 13 
FIN Finland 35  MKD Macedonia  6 
MLI Mali 2  SVN Slovenia 34 
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MLT Malta 34  SWE Sweden 35 
MYS Malaysia 12  SYR Syrian Arab Republic 3 
NER Niger 2  TCD Chad 1 
NGA Nigeria 2  TGO Togo 2 
NIC Nicaragua 8  THA Thailand 11 
NLD Netherlands 39  TKM Turkmenistan 6 
NOR Norway 24  TTO Trinidad and Tobago  3 
NZL New Zealand 6  TUN Tunisia 6 
PAK Pakistan 8  TUR Turkey 17 
PAN Panama 11  TZA Tanzania 5 
PER Peru 16  UGA Uganda 3 
PHL Philippines 9  UKR Ukraine 16 
POL Poland 34  URY Uruguay 5 
PRK Korea  2  USA United States of America 14 
PRT Portugal 37  UZB Uzbekistan 5 
PRY Paraguay 4  VEN Venezuela 4 
RUS Russian Federation 17  VNM Viet Nam  8 
SEN Senegal 2  YEM Yemen 1 
SGP Singapore 19  ZAF South Africa 4 
SLV El Salvador 9  ZMB Zambia 2 
SVK Slovakia  34  ZWE Zimbabwe 4 
 
 
